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Uncertainty is inherent to our knowledge about the state of the
world yet often not communicated alongside scientific facts and
numbers. In the “posttruth” era where facts are increasingly con-
tested, a common assumption is that communicating uncertainty
will reduce public trust. However, a lack of systematic research
makes it difficult to evaluate such claims. We conducted five exper-
iments—including one preregistered replication with a national
sample and one field experiment on the BBC News website (total
n = 5,780)—to examine whether communicating epistemic uncer-
tainty about facts across different topics (e.g., global warming, im-
migration), formats (verbal vs. numeric), and magnitudes (high vs.
low) influences public trust. Results show that whereas people do
perceive greater uncertainty when it is communicated, we observed
only a small decrease in trust in numbers and trustworthiness of the
source, and mostly for verbal uncertainty communication. These
results could help reassure all communicators of facts and science
that they can be more open and transparent about the limits of
human knowledge.
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Our knowledge is inherently uncertain. The process by whichwe gather information about the state of the world is char-
acterized by assumptions, limitations, extrapolations, and gener-
alizations, which brings imprecisions and uncertainties to the facts,
numbers, and scientific hypotheses that express our understanding
of the world around us. However, despite the fact that scientists
and other producers of knowledge are usually well-aware of the
uncertainties around their findings, these are often not commu-
nicated clearly to the public and other key stakeholders (1). This
lack of transparency could potentially compromise important de-
cisions people make based on scientific or statistical evidence,
from personal medical decisions to government policies.
Recent societal developments do not seem to encourage more
openness about uncertainty: It has been suggested that we are
living in a “posttruth” era in which facts, evidence, and experts
are deeply mistrusted (2). Cross-national survey studies suggest
that in many countries, trust in institutions and governments is in
decline (3–5). Although the underlying causes of changes in trust
are likely to be complex and varied, it has been suggested that
one way to potentially repair and restore public trust in science,
evidence, and official statistics is to be more open and trans-
parent about scientific uncertainty (2). However, it is often as-
sumed that communicating uncertainty transparently will invite
criticism, can signal incompetence, or even decrease public trust in
science (1, 6–8). In fact, as summarized by the National Acade-
mies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report on science
communication, “as a rule, people dislike uncertainty [...] people
may attribute uncertainty to poor science [. . . and] in some cases,
communicating uncertainty can diminish perceived scientific au-
thority” (ref. 7, pp. 27–28). For example, research by Johnson and
Slovic (9) found that for some respondents, uncertainty “evoked
doubt about agency trustworthiness” (p. 490), and that “despite
the general sense of honesty evoked [by uncertainty] . . . this did not
seem to offset concerns about the agency’s competence” (p. 491). In
fact, partly for these reasons, Fischhoff (1) notes that scientists may
be reluctant to discuss the uncertainties of their work. This hesita-
tion spans across domains: For example, journalists find it difficult
to communicate scientific uncertainty and regularly choose to ig-
nore it altogether (10, 11). Physicians are reluctant to communicate
uncertainty about evidence to patients (12), fearing that the com-
plexity of uncertainty may overwhelm and confuse patients (13, 14).
Osman et al. (15) even go as far as to argue explicitly that “the drive
to increase transparency on uncertainty of the scientific process
specifically does more harm than good” (p. 131).
At the same time, many organizations that produce and
communicate evidence to the public, such as the European Food
Safety Authority, have committed themselves to openness and
transparency about their (scientific) work, which includes com-
municating uncertainties around evidence (16–19). These at-
tempts have not gone without criticism and discussion about the
potential impacts on public opinion (15, 20). What exactly do we
know about the effects of communicating uncertainty around
facts, numbers, and science to the public?
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Prior research has distinguished between two kinds of un-
certainty: epistemic uncertainty about the past and present state
of the world that arises because of what we do not know but
could know in theory (e.g., uncertainty due to limitations of the
sample or methodology) vs. uncertainty about the future that
arises because we cannot know (i.e., randomness, chance; we
cannot know for certain what will happen tomorrow) (21). Al-
though uncertainty about the future is a widely acknowledged
aspect of forecasts and predictions, epistemic uncertainty about
the past and present is equally important yet often overlooked in
communication. It is the uncertainty around the decrease in
unemployment in the United Kingdom (e.g., estimated at a de-
crease of 119,000 people from January to March 2019 compared
to a year earlier, with a 95% CI of ±96,000) (22); or uncertainty
around the number of people who attended US President Trump’s
inauguration, which he famously claimed “had the biggest audience
in the history of inaugural speeches” (23) (attendance is estimated
to have been between 300,000 and 600,000) (24). Psychological
research suggests that people intuitively distinguish between these
two kinds of uncertainty (25, 26).
How people react to aleatoric uncertainty about the future has
been relatively well studied. A large literature indicates that
people are generally averse to uncertainty when making decisions
about the future—a psychological tendency known as ambiguity
aversion (27). Moreover, the relatively large body of research on
the interpretation of verbal expressions of uncertainty such as
“likely” or “unlikely” shows that there is considerable variability
between people in how they interpret these words, creating
problems for effective communication (28–31). It has therefore
been suggested that communicating uncertainty numerically might
be preferable; yet several studies found that numerical uncertainty
might suffer from its own interpretation issues (32–34). To illus-
trate, recent research has found that motivated cognition can have
an impact on probabilistic reasoning: Prior beliefs about climate
change or gun laws in the United States influenced people’s in-
terpretation of the distribution underlying ambiguous numerical
ranges about these issues (35).
However, much less research has specifically focused on epistemic
uncertainty. In fact, a recent review concluded that empirical evi-
dence about the psychological effects—positive or negative—of
communicating epistemic uncertainty about facts and numbers is
limited and scattered with mixed findings (21). For example,
research by Johnson and Slovic (9, 33, 36) suggests that com-
municating uncertainty via numerical ranges signaled honesty
and competency for some of their participants, but dishonesty
and incompetency for others. Other studies, for example, in the
context of cancer risk or scientific evidence about climate change
and genetically modified organisms, found that communicating
uncertainty around estimates did not seem to affect people’s
scientific beliefs or credibility judgments (8, 37, 38).
Given these mixed findings, the present research program
aims to address this gap in the literature and is one of the first to
examine the effects of communicating epistemic uncertainty
about facts, numbers, and evidence on public trust. We examine
the effects of communicating uncertainty around numbers—
including contested numbers—that are communicated routinely
in the media, such as the unemployment rate and migration
statistics. Specifically, we draw on a recent theoretical review
(21), which suggests that research on communicating epistemic
uncertainty should consider its effects on three key conceptual
dimensions, namely, 1) cognition (how people perceive and un-
derstand uncertainty), 2) emotion (how people feel about the
uncertainty), and 3) trustworthiness (the extent to which people
trust the information). Following recent work on source credi-
bility in science communication (39), we further consider and
conceptually distinguish two key forms of trust: people’s trust in
the numbers themselves and people’s trust in the “source” of
these numbers, for example, in the organization producing the
statistics. From a purely statistical point of view, variability
around a central estimate signals that the estimate is more un-
certain; thus, when uncertainty is taken into account, a logical
conclusion would be that the central estimate is less informative
and reliable. However, communicating uncertainty when it exists
can also be seen as part of an organization’s goal to be open and
transparent, which could foster perceived trustworthiness (40).
Given limited and mixed prior findings, we set out to systemat-
ically examine how communicating uncertainty about a range of
facts influences public trust in both numbers and their sources in
four large and diverse online experiments (combined n = 4,249)
and one field experiment on the BBC News website (n = 1,531).
We were particularly interested in comparing the effects of
communicating both verbal and numerical uncertainty around a
(contested) numeric estimate on perceived uncertainty (cogni-
tion) and perceived trustworthiness.*
In experiment 1, 1,122 participants read a short text about one
of three topics, which contained either no uncertainty (just a
point estimate), uncertainty communicated as a numerical range
(in addition to the point estimate), or uncertainty communicated
as a verbal statement (also in addition to the point estimate).
The three topics were as follows: the number of unemployed
people in the United Kingdom, the number of tigers currently
left in India, and the increase in the global average surface
temperature between 1880 and 2010. We selected these topics to
represent various “types” of numbers (large vs. small) as well as
for variation in their level of “contestedness.” That is, we
expected there to be different levels of variation in prior atti-
tudes toward the topics: Whereas opinions on climate change are
divided in the United Kingdom (41), we anticipated less division
in opinion around the conservation of endangered animals.
In the short text about unemployment, for example, partici-
pants read that recently an official report had been published,
which stated that between April and June 2017, the number of
unemployed people in the United Kingdom was an estimated
1,484,000. Participants then either received no further informa-
tion (control condition), or a numerical range (numerical un-
certainty condition: “minimum 1,413,000 to maximum 1,555,000”),
or an equivalent verbal statement (verbal uncertainty condition:
“The report states that there is some uncertainty around this es-
timate, it could be somewhat higher or lower”). The source of the
numbers was an “official report,” which was not further specified in
our first experiment in order to avoid source bias.
After reading the short text, participants first indicated how
the information made them feel on a feeling thermometer, then
were asked to recall the number they had just read about, and
subsequently were asked a series of questions about how un-
certain and reliable they perceived the number to be, and how
trustworthy they thought the writers of the report were. Our
measures of trust were modeled after prior studies from Johnson
and Slovic (9). To ensure that our findings are systematic and
robust, follow-up experiments—including a preregistered repli-
cation—varied the magnitude of the uncertainty in the message,
the style and format of how the uncertainty was communicated,
as well as the sampling platform.
Results
The analyses revealed no meaningful differences between topics
in how people reacted to the uncertainty communication. For
ease of interpretation, we therefore present the results collapsed
across topics (but see SI Appendix for further details). The results
showed that our manipulation was effective in that participants
perceived the numbers to be more uncertain when uncertainty
was communicated either numerically or verbally (Fig. 1A). An
*Effects on people’s emotions were of secondary interest and are reported in detail in the
SI Appendix.
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analysis of variance (ANOVA) testing the effect of uncertainty
communication (control vs. numerical vs. verbal) on perceived un-
certainty of the number showed a significant main effect [F(2, 1119) =
138.67, P < 0.001; η2 = 20]. All reported post hoc paired comparisons
used Tukey’s honestly significant difference. People who were pre-
sented with uncertainty as a numeric range perceived the numbers to
be significantly more uncertain compared to people in the control
condition [M = 4.78 vs. 4.14, Mdiff = 0.64, 95% confidence interval
(CI) [0.40; 0.88], d = 0.45]. Participants who were presented with
uncertainty as a verbal statement perceived the numbers to be
significantly more uncertain than both those in the numerical (M =
5.82 vs. 4.78, Mdiff = 1.04, 95% CI [0.80; 1.28], d = 0.79) and the
control conditions (M = 5.82 vs. 4.14, Mdiff = 1.68, 95% CI [1.44;
1.92], d = 1.17).
We also asked participants to indicate how reliable and how
trustworthy they thought the numbers were; given their correlation
(r = 0.88), scores on these two questions were combined to form a
measure of “trust in numbers.” The results showed that, although
our verbal phrase of uncertainty communication decreased trust in
numbers, our numerical uncertainty communication did not
(Fig. 1B). The ANOVA revealed a main effect of uncertainty
communication format [F(2,1119) = 60.96, P < 0.001; η2 = 0.10].
Verbal uncertainty communication reduced people’s trust in
numbers compared to the control condition (M = 3.51 vs. 4.52,
Mdiff = −1.01, 95% CI [−1.23; −0.79], d = 0.75) and compared to
numerical uncertainty communication (M = 3.51 vs. 4.31, Mdiff =
−0.80, 95% CI [−1.03; −0.57], d = 0.60). Importantly, there was
no significant difference in trust in numbers between the nu-
merical uncertainty communication and control conditions (M =
4.31 vs. 4.52, Mdiff = −0.21, 95% CI [−0.43; 0.01], d = 0.17).
Finally, we asked participants how trustworthy they thought
“the writers of the report” were, as a measure of trust in the
source. Again, we found that the verbal uncertainty communi-
cation led to a small significant decrease in people’s trust in the
source, whereas the numerical uncertainty communication did
not (Fig. 1C). The ANOVA showed a main effect of uncertainty
communication format [F(2, 1119) = 11.03, P < 0.001; η2 = 0.02].
Communicating uncertainty verbally reduced participant’s trust
in the source, compared to the control condition (M = 4.19 vs.
4.55, Mdiff = −0.36, 95% CI [−0.57; −0.15], d = 0.28) and nu-
merical uncertainty communication (M = 4.19 vs. 4.58, Mdiff =
−0.39, 95% CI [−0.61; −0.17], d = 0.31). Again, there was no
significant decrease for numerical uncertainty communication
compared to control (M = 4.58 vs. 4.55, Mdiff = 0.03, 95% CI
[−0.18; 0.24], d = 0.02).
Experiment 1 thus showed that while people did perceive
uncertainty about numbers both when it was communicated
numerically and verbally, only the verbal communication re-
duced people’s trust in the numbers and the source. In addition,
the results showed no significant effect of uncertainty commu-
nication on people’s affect or mood; please see SI Appendix for
the full results. Because we found no substantial differences
between topics in people’s responses to uncertainty, experiment
2 only used the UK employment number to study whether the
magnitude of the uncertainty itself can influence the psycho-
logical effects of communicating uncertainty.
Manipulating the Magnitude of Uncertainty. The goal of experi-
ment 2 was twofold: first, to replicate the results from experi-
ment 1 (for unemployment) and second, to examine whether
the magnitude of the uncertainty affected people’s trust in
numbers and trust in the source. This experiment followed a 1
(control condition: no uncertainty) + 2 (numerical vs. verbal
communication) × 3 (lower vs. original vs. higher uncertainty)
between-subject design. For numerical uncertainty communi-
cation, we presented the original 95% CI, which therefore
acted as a replication of experiment 1; lower uncertainty using a
range half the size (99.99% CI); or higher uncertainty using a
range twice as large (68% CI) as the original CI. For verbal
uncertainty communication, we presented the same baseline
phrase as in experiment 1 for the “original” magnitude (“. . .it
could be somewhat higher or lower”); less uncertainty using the
phrase “slightly higher or lower”; or more uncertainty using the
phrase “a lot higher or lower.” The verbal phrases were chosen
to mirror the magnitude of the numerical uncertainty.
First, we analyzed the results of the “original uncertainty”
levels and the control condition in experiment 2: a direct repli-
cation of experiment 1. For perceived uncertainty and trust in
the number, we replicated the results of the first experiment. The
analyses, all reported in detail in the SI Appendix, showed that
participants perceived the number to be significantly more un-
certain when numerical uncertainty was communicated (compared
to control) and when verbal uncertainty was communicated
(compared to both control and numerical uncertainty). Similarly,
just as in experiment 1, participants reported less trust in the
number when verbal uncertainty was communicated compared to
both control and when numerical uncertainty was communicated;
with no significant decrease in trust for numerical uncertainty
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Fig. 1. The results of experiment 1: Means per condition for perceived
uncertainty (A), trust in numbers (B), and trust in the source (C). The error
bars represent 95% CIs around the means, and jitter represents the distri-
bution of the underlying data.
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(compared to control). However, in contrast to experiment 1 where
we found that verbal uncertainty communication reduced trust in
the source, experiment 2 showed no significant effect of uncertainty
communication: Both numerical and verbal uncertainty communi-
cated did not decrease people’s trust in the source, compared to
control (please see SI Appendix, Fig. S2 A–C).
Next, we examined the effects of the magnitude of uncertainty.
Somewhat surprisingly, we found that the magnitude of the
communicated uncertainty did not affect people’s perceptions of
the uncertainty of the numbers (Fig. 2A). A two-way ANOVA of
format (numeric vs. verbal) and magnitude (lower vs. original vs.
higher) showed a significant main effect of format [F(1, 741) =
67.93, P < 0.001; η2p = 0.08], but no significant main effect of
magnitude [F(2, 741) = 2.92, P = 0.055; η2p = 0.01] nor a significant
interaction [F(2, 741) = 1.86, P = 0.16; η2p = 0.01]. Regardless of
magnitude, and as in experiment 1, verbal uncertainty communi-
cation led to higher levels of perceived uncertainty than numerical
uncertainty communication (M = 5.50 vs. 4.68, Mdiff = 0.83, 95%
CI [0.63; 1.03], d = 0.60).
However, the results did show a small effect of magnitude on
people’s trust in numbers (Fig. 2B). An ANOVA of format and
magnitude showed a main effect of format [F(1, 741) = 43.44, P <
0.001; η2p = 0.06], and main effect of magnitude [F(2, 741) = 3.63,
P = 0.03; η2p = 0.01], but no significant interaction [F(2, 741) = 1.44,
P = 0.24]. Regardless of magnitude, verbal uncertainty commu-
nication decreased trust in numbers compared to numerical
communication (M = 3.56 vs. 4.20, Mdiff = −0.64, 95% CI
[−0.83; −0.45], d = 0.48). In addition, across formats, post hoc
comparisons showed that a lower magnitude of uncertainty led to
higher trust in numbers compared to the original range or phrase
(M = 4.06 vs. 3.75, Mdiff = 0.31, 95% CI [0.03; 0.58], d = 0.23).
Both comparisons were not significantly different from higher
magnitude of uncertainty (Fig. 2B).
For trust in the source, communication format (numerical or
verbal) appeared to make no difference, but the magnitude of the
uncertainty did (Fig. 2C). An ANOVA of format and magnitude
showed no main effect of format [F(1, 741) = 0.96, P = 0.33], a
significant main effect of magnitude [F(2, 741) = 4.30, P = 0.01;
η2p = 0.01], but no significant interaction [F(2, 741) = 0.37, P = 0.69].
Regardless of format, lower magnitudes of uncertainty led to
higher levels of trust in the source compared to the original
range or phrase (M = 4.34 vs. 4.01, Mdiff = 0.33, 95% CI [0.06;
0.60], d = 0.26), but neither were significantly different from
higher magnitude of uncertainty (M = 4.23, SD = 1.31; Fig. 2C).
The results of experiment 2 thus suggest that magnitude,
communicated without further context, did not have a strong
impact on people’s reactions to uncertainty communication: It
did not influence perceptions of uncertainty, and only lower
magnitudes of uncertainty were related to slightly higher levels of
perceived reliability of the number and trustworthiness of the
source. Without further context, participants might not have
been able to interpret the numerical ranges as being relatively
small or large magnitudes of uncertainty, although the same is
not true of the verbal conditions. Although preliminary, what we
can conclude from these results is that, in the absence of further
context, it appears that whether and how uncertainty is com-
municated is more important in determining how people re-
spond than the magnitude of the uncertainty in question.
Varying the Format of Uncertainty Communication. Following these
findings, we set out to systematically test the effects of additional
numeric and verbal uncertainty communication formats in ex-
periment 3, and to move toward a more realistic and better con-
textualized communication scenario. This experiment had eight
conditions, which are presented in Table 1. The choice of formats
was influenced by the formats the UK Office for National Sta-
tistics uses to communicate uncertainty around unemployment
numbers, which was again the context we used for this experiment
for consistency. To improve the ecological validity of the experi-
ment, the manipulation was written as a traditional news media
article and included two unemployment figures. Uncertainty was
communicated in the same format around both figures.
Results are presented in Fig. 3. The level of perceived un-
certainty around the numbers differed between formats [Fig. 3A;
one-way ANOVA effect of format: F(7, 1192) = 14.43, P < 0.001;
η2 = 0.08]. For all formats in which uncertainty was being com-
municated, except one, participants perceived the numbers to be
more uncertain compared to the control condition (post hoc
paired comparisons: p values = 0.022 to <0.001; Mdiff = 0.53 to
1.10; d values = 0.37 to 0.72). The exception was the condition in
which only the word “estimated” had been added (Mdiff = −0.07,
P = 1.00). People in this condition did not perceive the numbers to
be more uncertain compared to those in the control condition,
indicating that only using the word “estimated” seems insufficient
to communicate the existence of uncertainty around a number.
People’s trust in numbers similarly differed between formats
[Fig. 3B; F(7, 1192) = 5.97, P < 0.001; η2 = 0.03]. Whereas for most
formats, people’s trust in the numbers was significantly reduced
compared to control (post hoc paired comparisons: p values =
0.035 to 0.011; Mdiff = −0.47 to −0.53; d values = 0.35 to 0.37),
this was not the case when uncertainty was communicated with
the word “estimated” (Mdiff = 0.13, 95% CI [−0.33; 0.59], P =
0.98), with the implicit uncertainty statement (Mdiff = −0.37,
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Fig. 2. The results of experiment 2: Means per condition for perceived
uncertainty (A), trust in numbers (B), and trust in the source (C). The error
bars represent 95% CIs around the means, and jitter represents the distri-
bution of the underlying data.
van der Bles et al. PNAS | April 7, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 14 | 7675
PS
YC
H
O
LO
G
IC
A
L
A
N
D
CO
G
N
IT
IV
E
SC
IE
N
CE
S
95% CI [−0.83; 0.08], P = 0.20), or with a numerical range with
point estimate (Mdiff = −0.10, 95% CI [−0.56; 0.36], P = 1.00).
In this experiment, we assessed trust in the source by asking
people to what extent they thought that the civil servants who
were responsible for the unemployment figures were trustworthy.
Results are shown in Fig. 3C. We found that different formats
did make a small difference to people’s trust in the source [one-
way ANOVA: F(7, 1192) = 2.15, P = 0.04; η2 = 0.01]. However,
that difference was not between the conditions in which un-
certainty was communicated and the control: Across all formats,
trust in the source did not differ significantly from the control
condition (range M = 3.94 to 4.48 vs. Mcontrol = 4.24, SDcontrol =
1.55). The difference was between specific formats: Compared to
people to whom uncertainty was communicated through the word
“estimated,” people to whom uncertainty was communicated in
the numeric +/− format or mixed format (“estimated +/−”) per-
ceived the source to be significantly less trustworthy (M = 4.48 vs.
3.94, Mdiff = 0.54, 95% CI [0.02; 1.06], d = 0.40 and M = 4.48 vs.
3.94, Mdiff = 0.54, 95% CI [0.03; 1.05], d = 0.39, respectively).
To examine the boundary conditions of the effects on trust, we
also asked people to indicate how trustworthy they thought jour-
nalists who write news articles like the ones they had read were
and how reliable they thought government statistics in general are;
these judgements did not differ significantly for different uncer-
tainty communication formats [F(7, 1192) = 1.60, P = 0.13; η2 = 0.01,
and F(7, 1192) = 1.60, P = 0.13; η2 = 0.01, respectively].
In conclusion, then, the results of experiment 3 showed that
whereas participants perceived uncertainty when uncertainty was
communicated in most numeric and verbal formats, not all for-
mats affected people’s trust in the numbers. Communicating
uncertainty via a numerical range with point estimate or an im-
plicit verbal statement did not significantly decrease trust in
numbers compared to the control condition. Adding the word
“estimated” also did not decrease trust, but this format apparently
failed to communicate uncertainty to people. However, impor-
tantly, just as in experiment 2, none of the uncertainty commu-
nication formats decreased trust in the source compared to not
communicating uncertainty: There was no impact of uncertainty
communication when we asked people about the trustworthiness
of the civil servants responsible for the statistics, nor for jour-
nalists who write such articles.
Uncertainty Around Contested Numbers. Experiments 2 and 3 were
conducted in the context of UK unemployment numbers, which
are generally considered not highly contested and thus might be
less likely to result in changes in trust-related perceptions. We
therefore conducted experiment 4 in the context of UK migration,
which is a more contested issue on which public opinion is divided
(42). Experiment 4 was preregistered on aspredicted.org (https://
aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=d3xu67) and also conducted on a
national sample of the UK population (Methods). Participants
were first asked about their attitudes toward migration, before
being randomly selected to read one of five versions of a fictitious
newspaper article about migration statistics, which are presented
in Table 1.
The results of experiment 4 showed that, similar to experiment
3, participants perceived the number to be more uncertain for all
communication formats compared to the control condition, except
for just using the word “around” before the number [Fig. 4A; one-
way ANOVA F(4, 1045) = 22.11, P < 0.001; η2 = 0.08]. Post hoc
paired comparisons showed significant differences between the
control condition vs. communicating uncertainty as a numeric
range (M = 4.47 vs. 5.27, Mdiff = −0.80, 95% CI [−1.22; −0.39],
d = 0.50), using “+/−” (M = 4.47 vs. 5.24, Mdiff = −0.77, 95% CI
[−1.19; −0.35], d = 0.50), and as an explicit verbal statement (M =
4.47 vs. 5.52, Mdiff = −1.06, 95% CI [−1.48; −0.64], d = 0.68).
As Fig. 4B shows, communication formats did affect partici-
pants’ trust in numbers [one-way ANOVA F(4, 1044) = 7.29, P <
0.001; η2 = 0.03], but this overall effect was qualified by a sig-
nificant decrease in trust for the explicit verbal statement when
compared to control (M = 3.28 vs. 3.90, Mdiff = −0.62, 95% CI
[−1.01; −0.23], d = 0.42). The numerical formats and the verbal
“around” condition did not significantly reduce trust in numbers
compared to control.
Furthermore, we found no effect of uncertainty communi-
cation on participants’ trust in the source, which in this exper-
iment was assessed as perceived trustworthiness of “the civil
Table 1. Overview of the conditions and manipulation texts of experiment 3 and 4
Format Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Control
(no uncertainty)
“Official figures from the first quarter of 2018 show
that UK unemployment fell by 116,000 compared
with the same period last year. [. . .]”
“Migration figures: EU migration still
adding to UK population. Official figures from
last year show that there were 101,000 more
people coming to the UK from the EU than
leaving in 2017. This is the lowest EU net
migration figure since 2013, but it means that
EU migrants are still adding to the UK
population. [. . .]”
Numerical range with
point estimate
. . .by 116,000 (range between 17,000 and 215,000). . . . . .101,000 (range between 68,000 and
132,000). . .
Numerical range
without point estimate
. . .by between 17,000 and 215,000. . .
Numerical point
estimate ±2 SEs
. . .by 116,000 (±99,000). . . . . .101,000 (±33,000). . .
Verbal explicit
uncertainty statement
. . .by 116,000 compared with the same period last year,
although there is some uncertainty around this
figure: It could be somewhat higher or lower. [. . .]
. . .101,000 more people coming to the UK from
the EU than leaving in 2017. The report states
there is uncertainty around the exact figure—
it could be higher or lower. [. . .]
Verbal implicit
uncertainty statement
. . .by 116,000 compared with the same period last year,
although there is a range around this figure: could be
somewhat higher or lower. [. . .]
Verbal uncertainty word . . .by an estimated 116,000. . . . . .around 101,000. . .
Mixed numerical and verbal phrase . . .by an estimated 116,000 (±99,000). . .
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servants responsible for the migration statistics” [F(4, 1045) =
1.19, P = 0.31].
In summary, we found that whereas both numeric formats and
the explicit verbal statement did communicate uncertainty
around the net migration number, only the explicit verbal state-
ment decreased perceived reliability of the number, and no
format decreased participants’ perceptions of trustworthiness of
the source. This pattern of results is broadly consistent with our
preregistered hypotheses based on our previous three studies
(see SI Appendix for more details).
We also asked people to what extent they thought that 1) the
conclusions based on the number, 2) the news article they just
read, 3) journalists who write news articles such as this one, and
4) government statistics in general were trustworthy.
This revealed that format did affect trust in the conclusions
[one-way ANOVA of format: F(4, 1045) = 3.53, P = 0.007;
η2 = 0.01]. This was due to the explicit verbal statement of un-
certainty leading to lower trust in the conclusions than the word
“around” (post hoc paired comparisons: M = 3.51 vs. 3.96,
Mdiff = −0.45, 95% CI [−0.84; −0.05], d = 0.30). All uncertainty
communication formats did not differ significantly from the
control condition (M = 3.90, SD = 1.46).
Second, there appeared to be a small effect of format on trust
in the news article itself (one-way ANOVA of format: F(4, 1042) =
2.43, P = 0.046; η2 = 0.01), but post hoc paired comparisons did
not show significant differences between formats—it was again
mainly driven by a decrease for the explicit verbal statement
compared to the control condition (M = 3.66 vs. 4.04, Mdiff =
−0.38, 95% CI [−0.77; 0.01], d = 0.26).
Third, consistent with experiment 3, participants’ trust in
journalists and in government statistics in general were not sig-
nificantly affected by communicating uncertainty in these dif-
ferent formats (one-way ANOVAs: F(4, 1044) = 0.85, P = 0.50,
and F(4, 1045) = 1.73, P = 0.14, respectively). These additional
findings suggest that communicating uncertainty verbally has an
impact on the perceived reliability of the number itself and con-
clusions based on a number, but does not seem to impact judge-
ments about the source(s) of numbers (civil servants or journalists),
nor generalize to governmental statistics more broadly.
Given the contested nature of immigration statistics, we also
explored the extent to which people’s prior attitudes toward
immigration affected the results. We split our sample into two
groups (based on the median = 4.33): people with negative at-
titudes toward immigration (mean, 1.00 to 4.00) and people with
positive attitudes (mean, 4.33 to 7.00). Two-way ANOVAs
(format × immigration attitude: negative vs. positive) revealed
main effects of immigration attitudes on perceived uncertainty,
trust in numbers, and trust in the source, but no interaction ef-
fects. People with positive attitudes toward immigration perceived
less uncertainty around the numbers [F(1, 1040) = 6.15, P = 0.01;
η2p = 0.01], reported more trust in the numbers [F(1, 1039) = 33.39,
P < 0.001; η2p = 0.03], and more trust in the source [F(1, 1040) =
45.22, P < 0.001; η2p = 0.04] than people with negative attitudes
toward immigration. However, we found no significant interaction
effects between attitudes and communication format. To assess
the robustness of these results, we also conducted a series of
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Fig. 4. The results of experiment 4: Means per condition for perceived
uncertainty (A), trust in numbers (B), and trust in the source (C). The error
bars represent 95% CIs around the means, and the jitter represents the
distribution of the underlying data.
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hierarchical linear regressions with a continuous interaction
term. These analyses produced the same findings and are
reported in the SI Appendix. Overall, how people responded to
uncertainty communication was not affected by their prior at-
titudes toward immigration.
Internal Metaanalysis. To consolidate all of our main findings and
to shed further light on the psychological effects of communi-
cating uncertainty, we conducted a random-effects metaanalysis
across all four studies for each of our key dependent variables.
To ensure that the results were comparable, we only included the
formats that were consistently tested across all four experiments.
For ease of interpretation, we contrast “no uncertainty” (control
condition) vs. “uncertainty” communication, differentiating only
between “verbal” (explicit verbal statement) vs. “numeric” (numeric
range with point estimate) uncertainty communication as separate
subgroups. Results are presented in Fig. 5.
Overall, the communication of uncertainty in itself had a large
effect on perceived uncertainty (d = 0.65; 95% CI [0.42; 0.87]),
with the effect of verbal uncertainty (d = 0.88; 95% CI [0.62;
1.14]) being over twice that of numeric uncertainty (d = 0.43;
95% CI [0.33; 0.52]). Importantly, the communication of un-
certainty did lead to a significant overall decrease in perceived
reliability of the numbers (d = −0.34; 95% CI [−0.16; −0.53]).
Although relatively small and nonsignificant across some of the
studies, the weighted effect of providing numeric uncertainty on
trust in numbers was also negative and significant (d = −0.15;
95% CI [−0.05; −0.24]). However, much of the overall effect
seems to stem from verbal uncertainty, as the negative effect of
verbal uncertainty on trust in numbers was much more sub-
stantial (d = −0.55; 95% CI [−0.35; −0.74]). Last, although the
weighted effect of the communication of uncertainty across
studies did also significantly and negatively influence perceived
trustworthiness of the source (d = −0.12; 95% CI [−0.03; −0.22]),
the size of the effect is similarly small and seems to be driven by
verbal uncertainty (d = −0.21; 95% CI [−0.12; −0.31]) rather than
numeric uncertainty (d = −0.03; 95% CI [−0.03; 0.06]).
Field Experiment on the BBC News Website. Finally, we assessed to
what extent our findings would generalize beyond the context of
an online laboratory experiment to a real-world setting. We there-
fore engaged in a unique experiment on the live BBC News website
to test the effects of communicating uncertainty in an online news
article about the United Kingdom’s labor market statistics, which
are released monthly by the Office for National Statistics.
After a pilot experiment using a BBC News article about the
UK labor market in September 2019, which is reported in the SI
Appendix, we conducted an experiment with an online news ar-
ticle about the UK labor market on October 15, 2019. Readers of
the live BBC News website were randomly shown one of three
versions of the news article (Fig. 6). The first figure mentioned in
this article was the unemployment rate, which “. . . unexpectedly
rose to 3.9% in the June-to-August period from 3.8%, after the
number of people in work unexpectedly fell by 56,000, official
figures showed.” Readers were either shown this target figure
without any uncertainty mentioned, as is common in all news
reporting (including the BBC); with a verbal uncertainty cue
(“. . . rose to an estimated 3.9%”), as is sometimes used in BBC
News reporting; or with a numeric range and verbal cue [“. . . rose
to an estimated 3.9% (between 3.7% and 4.1%)”], which is un-
common in news reporting. All other figures mentioned in the
article were reported without uncertainty. After the first para-
graph of the news article, which contained the figure of interest,
readers were invited to take part in a short study about this ar-
ticle. As our survey had to be brief, we only included our key
measures: After asking participants to rate their current emo-
tional state (affect), we asked them how certain or uncertain they
thought the unemployment rate figure in the story was, how
trustworthy it was, and how trustworthy and competent the
statisticians responsible for producing the figure were, and how
trustworthy they thought the journalist responsible for producing
the article was. The results are presented in Fig. 7.
The results of this field experiment showed that, in line with
the laboratory experiments, people perceived the number to be
more uncertain when numerical uncertainty had been commu-
nicated, compared to no uncertainty communication in the
Fig. 5. Random-effects metaanalysis. Perceived uncertainty (A), trust in
numbers (B), and trust in the source (C).
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control condition. An ANOVA showed a significant main effect
of uncertainty communication on perceived uncertainty [F(2, 1526) =
4.67, P = 0.01; η2 = 0.006]. Participants who read the version of the
news article with a numeric range around the unemployment rate
figure perceived the figure to be more uncertain than people in the
control condition (M = 3.56 vs. 3.31, Mdiff = 0.25, 95% CI [0.06;
0.44], d = 0.19). Participants who read the version of the news ar-
ticle with the verbal cue scored in between the numerical and
control conditions, not significantly different from either (M = 3.41,
SD = 1.39). This finding suggests that participants did seem to have
noticed the uncertainty that was communicated.
Uncertainty communication, however, did not affect partici-
pants’ trust in the number [F(2, 1526) = 1.20, P = 0.30], nor trust in
the source, in this case, the statisticians responsible for producing
the figures [F(2, 1525) = 1.24, P = 0.29]. These findings comple-
ment the results from our laboratory experiments, which showed
that a verbal cue such as “estimated” did not seem to commu-
nicate uncertainty to people and did not affect their trust in
numbers or the source (as found in experiments 3 and 4). In this
field experiment, we again found communicating uncertainty as a
numeric range did not affect people’s trust in the source, and it
also did not affect trust in the number.
In addition, the results showed no significant effects of un-
certainty communication on affect [F(2, 1519) = 0.44, P = 0.65],
competence of the source [F(2, 1525) = 0.61, P = 0.54], and
trustworthiness of the journalist [F(2, 1526) = 0.86, P = 0.42].
Participants’ judgments of the competence and trustworthiness
of the statisticians were highly correlated (r = 0.80, P < 0.001),
and on the high end of the scale (M = 5.44, SD = 1.41, and M =
5.28, SD = 1.55, respectively, out of seven); participants’ rating of
the trustworthiness of the journalist was slightly lower (M = 4.61,
SD = 1.54). These results suggest that communicating uncertainty
to the participants of this field study, did not affect their (already
positive) views of the trustworthiness and competence of the people
involved in producing and reporting unemployment figures.
Discussion
Centuries of human thinking about uncertainty among many
leaders, journalists, scientists, and policymakers boil down to a
simple and powerful intuition: “No one likes uncertainty” (1, 6,
7, 27). It is therefore often assumed that communicating un-
certainty transparently will decrease public trust in science (1, 7).
In this program of research, we set out to investigate whether such
claims have any empirical basis. We did this by communicating
epistemic uncertainty around basic facts and numbers and by
systematically varying 1) the topic, 2) the magnitude of the un-
certainty, and 3) the format and context through which uncertainty
was communicated. We assessed the effects of uncertainty on
relevant outcome measures, including cognition and trust.
Fig. 6. Image of the BBC News article that was used in experiment 5 (nu-
merical condition: including a numeric range). Reprinted with permission
from BBC News.
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Overall, we found little evidence to suggest that communi-
cating numerical uncertainty about measurable facts and num-
bers backfires or elicits psychological reactance. Across five high-
powered studies and an internal metaanalysis, we show that
people do recognize and perceive uncertainty when communi-
cated around point estimates, both verbally and numerically
(except when only words such as “estimated” or “about” are used
to imply uncertainty). In addition, uncertainty did not seem to
influence their affective reaction (SI Appendix), and although the
provision of uncertainty in general did slightly decrease people’s
trust in and perceived reliability of the numbers, this effect
emerged for explicit verbal uncertainty in particular.
Our research offers an important bridge between producers of
statistics, communicators, and their audiences. For example,
statisticians or scientists could argue that because most numeric
estimates are never completely certain, presenting uncertainty
around the number offers more precise information and should
therefore foster more trustworthiness, not less. However, if a
general audience had not considered that there might be any
uncertainty around a number in the first place (e.g., around
unemployment), then from a purely normative point of view
people’s reaction to uncertainty in our studies is not entirely
inappropriate: By providing clear variability around estimates, it
is reasonable for people to adjust their level of trust in the
numbers themselves. In a similar vein, one might argue that it is
difficult for people to appraise the trustworthiness of a number
without having access to the methodology through which the
estimate is derived. However, from a social scientific standpoint,
we recognize that people are frequently exposed to numbers in
the news without necessarily having access to additional in-
formation, for example, about the quality of the underlying evi-
dence (or indirect uncertainty). So how do people actually arrive
at a judgment as to what numbers are reliable and trustworthy in
the face of uncertainty? Although we did not set out explicitly to
investigate the mechanism by which people adjust their judg-
ments in response to uncertainty, an exploratory mediation
analysis on the nationally representative sample (experiment 4)
clearly suggests that the main effect of uncertainty communica-
tion (uncertainty vs. no uncertainty) on trustworthiness is fully
mediated by people’s perception of the uncertainty (see SI Ap-
pendix for mediation analyses). In other words, this suggests that
the more uncertain people perceive the numbers to be, the less
reliable and trustworthy they find them. The current results help
inform theoretical predictions about how people might respond
to direct uncertainty about numbers, and we encourage future
research to further investigate potential mechanisms as well as
how people might respond to indirect uncertainty, such as addi-
tional information about the quality of the underlying evidence.
In sum, prior research has investigated whether the provision
of uncertainty can help signal transparency and honesty on be-
half of the communicator, or—in contrast—whether communi-
cating uncertainty decreases trust and signals incompetence (9,
15, 17, 36). By and large, our findings illustrate that the provision
of numerical uncertainty—in particular as a numeric range—
does not substantially decrease trust in either the numbers or the
source of the message. Verbal quantifiers of uncertainty, how-
ever, do seem to decrease both perceived reliability of the
numbers as well as the perceived trustworthiness of the source.
These findings were robust across topics (both contested and
noncontested), mode of communication, and magnitude of un-
certainty. More generally, the strong negative effects of verbal
uncertainty appear consistent with prior findings that people are
averse to more ambiguous statements (27, 43). As such, we hy-
pothesize that the communication of numerical uncertainty may
offer a degree of precision that reduces people’s tendency to
view the admission of uncertainty as a sign of incompetence (1, 9,
36). On the other hand, across all studies, the communication
of uncertainty never significantly increased perceived trust or
reliability either, which is an important finding in itself and
warrants further research.
Accordingly, based on these results, we therefore recommend
that the communication of uncertainty around basic facts and
numbers in the media is best conveyed through numerical ranges
with a point estimate. This format in particular did not seem to
significantly influence (i.e., reduce) perceived trust and reliability
in either the number or the source of uncertainty. In addition, we
draw attention to the fact that using the word “estimate” or in-
creasing the magnitude of the confidence interval did not seem
to alter people’s perception of uncertainty, which points to the
need to better contextualize the degree of uncertainty for people.
Last, it is notable that we find little evidence for the motivated
cognition of uncertainty (35). For example, even around more
contested topics, such as global warming and immigration, al-
though main effects were observed for people’s prior attitude
toward the issue, there was no significant interaction with the
communication of uncertainty. At the very least, this suggests
that motivated interpretations of uncertainty do not always oc-
cur. At the same time, we must acknowledge several limitations
of our program of research.
First, we recognize that people are known to struggle with
psychological uncertainty about the future (44, 45), perhaps more
so than uncertainty about measurable facts and numbers, an area
previously neglected, and thus the focus of the current work. The
context of our research was also limited, culturally, to the United
Kingdom, and more contested examples for this population (e.g.,
around the United Kingdom’s political exit from the European
Union) may have elicited different results. Moreover, while we
conceptually replicated our results across multiple studies and
platforms—including a preregistered national sample—we did not
investigate uncertainty around more emotionally charged topics in
this study, such as uncertainty about personal health outcomes
(e.g., cancer), nor manipulated contestedness as an experimental
factor. Indeed, there may be other circumstances (not examined
here) where a significant degree of uncertainty could elicit strong
emotional reactions. Finally, we attempted to improve the eco-
logical and external validity of our manipulations by engaging in a
real-world experiment on the live BBC News website. Although
findings corroborated what we observed in controlled laboratory
settings, the BBC study necessarily relied on a somewhat skewed
and self-selected sample. In addition, although we generally relied
on large and diverse samples, and our main effects were suffi-
ciently powered, we may not have had sufficient power to detect
very small effects in all post hoc comparisons. Sensitivity analyses
showed, however, that given the sample sizes of experiments 3 and
4 (and assuming α = 0.05 and power of 0.80), we should have been
able to detect small effects in these studies (f = 0.101, d = 0.20;
and f = 0.107, d = 0.21, respectively). The smallest effects of in-
terest reported in our paper are broadly beyond those thresholds
(e.g., d = 0.26 to 0.72).
Nonetheless, even considering all of these boundary conditions,
our results help inform and challenge strongly held—and often
nonempirical—assumptions across domains about how the public
will react to the communication of uncertainty about basic science,
facts, and numbers (1, 7). A key challenge to maintaining public
trust in science is for communicators to be honest and transparent
about the limitations of our current state of knowledge. The high
degree of consistency in our results, across topics, magnitudes of
uncertainty, and communication formats suggest that people “can
handle the truth.” However, if we want to effectively convey un-
certainty about pressing issues, such as rising sea levels, the
number of tigers left in India, the state of the economy, or how
many people turn out to presidential elections; natural scientists,
statisticians, and social scientists should work together to evaluate
how to best present scientific uncertainty in an open and trans-
parent manner. As such, our findings can provide valuable guid-
ance to scientists, communicators, practitioners, and policymakers
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alike, who are all united by a common interest in how to effectively
communicate the truth in a so-called posttruth world.
Materials and Methods
The survey experiments were completed in a web browser and took ∼12 min
to complete. For experiments 1 to 3, we recruited participants on the plat-
form Prolific. Prolific has been found to be similar to Amazon Mechanical
Turk in terms of data quality, and better suited to recruit UK-based partic-
ipants (46, 47). Participants were paid £1.20 for their participation and were
not allowed to participate in more than one experiment. For experiment 4,
we used Qualtrics Panels to recruit a sample that was nationally represen-
tative of the United Kingdom population in terms of gender, age, and re-
gion in which the participants lived. For experiment 5, a field study, we
collaborated with BBC News and recruited visitors of the BBC News website
and app. This survey took ∼2 min to complete. Ethical approval for this re-
search was granted by the Cambridge Psychology Research Ethics Committee
(experiments 1, 2, and 5) and the Department of Psychology Ethics Com-
mittee (experiments 3 and 4) of the University of Cambridge. All participants
gave informed consent before participation and received detailed debrief-
ing information afterward. SI Appendix includes tables with an overview of
the characteristics of the participants for each experiment (SI Appendix,
Table S1) and per condition in each experiment (SI Appendix, Tables S2–S6),
which show that the experimental groups were balanced in terms of par-
ticipants’ age, gender, education level, and numeracy.
Experiment 1.
Sample and design. In experiment 1, we used a between-subjects design to test
three forms of uncertainty communication (numeric vs. verbal vs. control) about
three topics (tigers vs. unemployment vs. climate change). Based on a priori
power calculations, which indicated we would need 1,075 people for 90%
power to detect a small (interaction) effect (f = 0.12) when αwas set at 0.05, we
decided to recruit 1,125 participants (125 per cell of the design; we did this for
experiment 2 and 3 as well). Three of these participants indicated to be below
18 y of age and were excluded from further analyses. The sample thus con-
sisted of n = 1,122 people [769 women (68.5%); average age, 37.72; SD, 12.12;
range, 18 to 72]. Compared to the UK population, this sample was relatively
highly educated. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
data show that 18.8% of the 24- to 65-y-olds in the United Kingdom attained
primary and middle school education, 35.4% upper secondary education
(General Certificate of Secondary Education [GCSE] and A-levels), and 45.7%
attainted tertiary education (bachelor’s, master’s, PhD, etc.) (48). In our sample,
1.6% indicated to have no educational qualifications, 38.5% indicated to have
attained upper secondary education, and 59.6% indicated to have attained
tertiary education. On average, political orientation of the sample was slightly
leaning toward liberal (M = 3.49, SD = 1.42, on a scale from 1 = very liberal to
7 = very conservative).
Treatment and procedure. After agreeing to participate, participants were
asked several questions about their beliefs related to the three topics: about
the conservation of endangered animals, about the present state of the
country and economy, and about climate change (for more information on all
measures, see SI Appendix). After this, participants were randomly allocated
to be presented with one of nine texts. For example, the text about un-
employment read as follows:
Recently, an official report came out with new information about the
unemployment rate in the United Kingdom. This report stated that be-
tween April and June 2017, government statistics showed that an esti-
mated 1,484,000 people in the UK were unemployed.
Participants in the control condition only read about this central estimate,
without any information about uncertainty. For participants in the numeric
uncertainty communication condition, the exact same sentence finished with a
numeric range: “. . .unemployed (minimum 1,413,000 to maximum 1,555,000).”
For participants in the verbal uncertainty communication condition, an extra
sentence was added to the text: “The report states that there is some un-
certainty around this estimate, it could be somewhat higher or lower.” The
control text about tigers reported that “an official report stated that in 2015 an
estimated 2,226 tigers were left in India.” In the numeric uncertainty commu-
nication condition, a range of minimum 1,945 to maximum 2,491 was added,
and in the verbal uncertainty communication condition, the exact same sen-
tence was used as in the unemployment condition. The text about climate
change reported that “an official report stated that between 1880 and 2012,
the earth’s average global surface temperature has increased by an estimated
0.85°C.” In the numeric uncertainty condition, a range of minimum 0.65 to
maximum 1.06 was added, and once again the exact same sentence was used in
the verbal condition (somewhat higher or lower). These numbers are based on
reports by the UK Office for National Statistics (49), the International Union for
Conservation of Nature Red list (50), and the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (51), respectively.
Measures. After reading the text, participants first reported how the in-
formation made them feel on a standard feeling thermometer from 0 =
negative/unhappy to 10 = positive/happy (results are reported in the SI
Appendix). They were then asked to recall what number was reported in the
text (open question), and whether they remembered any uncertainty being
implied around this number (yes, no, don’t know, don’t remember). These
questions served as manipulation checks and to increase the salience of the
target number. The open text responses showed that most participants were
able to either correctly recall the target number (in experiment 2, where
we coded all responses: 54.4%), or give a sensible estimate of the target
number (experiment 2: 30.2%), indicating that generally participants un-
derstood what we meant by “this number” in the questions that followed.
Next, our key dependent variables were assessed: perceived uncertainty of
the number (average of 2 items, “To what extent do you think that this
number is certain or uncertain?”: 1 = very certain to 7 = very uncertain;
“How much uncertainty do you think there is about this number?”: 10-point
slider: not at all uncertain to very uncertain; r = 0.63), trust in the number
(modeled after ref. 9; average of 2 items, “To what extent do you think this
number is reliable [trustworthy]?”: 7-point scale from 1 = not at all to 7 =
very reliable [trustworthy]; r = 0.88), and trust in the source (“To what extent
do you think the writers of this report are trustworthy?”: 7-point scale from
1 = not at all to 7 = very trustworthy). In addition, we also asked people to
how uncertain the number made them feel (10-point slider, 1 = not at all to
10 = very uncertain; results reported in SI Appendix). After these dependent
variables, a series of unrelated variables were assessed (for more in-
formation, see SI Appendix). The experiment finished with questions about
demographic information and a detailed debrief.
Experiment 2.
Sample and design. Experiment 2 followed on from experiment 1. Instead of
varying the topics, however, we were interested in the effect of different
magnitudes of uncertainty. This experiment therefore consisted of a control
condition (no uncertainty communicated) plus a 2 (numeric vs. verbal un-
certainty communication) × 3 (lower vs. original vs. higher magnitude of
uncertainty) factorial design; so a total of seven conditions, to which par-
ticipants were randomly allocated. Based on a priori power calculations,
which indicated we would need 752 participants for 90% power to detect a
small (f = 0.13) interaction effect between format and magnitude when α
was set at 0.05, we recruited 877 participants from Prolific (∼125 per cell for
the seven-cell design). The sample consisted of 582 women and 292 men
(average age, 34.68; SD, 12.02; range, 18 to 80). Similar to experiment 1,
this sample was relatively highly educated compared to the UK population:
1.1% indicated to have no educational qualifications, 39% indicated to
have attained upper secondary education, and 59.8% indicated to have
attained tertiary education. On average, political orientation of the sample
was slightly liberal (M = 3.40; SD = 1.42).
Treatment and procedure.All participants read the same text as in study 1 about
unemployment, with either no uncertainty communicated, or uncertainty
communicated numerically or verbally. The different magnitudes were either
the original magnitude that was communicated in experiment 1, which was a
numerical range of 1,413,000 to 1,555,000 (95% CI around the point estimate
of 1,484,000 unemployed people) or the sentence stating that the number
could be “somewhat higher or lower.” However, in addition, lower un-
certainty was communicated as a range of minimum 1,448,500 to maximum
1,519,500 (a 68% CI around the point estimate, which is a range that is half as
wide as the original) or through the wording “slightly higher or lower” (verbal
condition). Higher uncertainty was communicated as a range of minimum
1,342,000 to maximum 1,626,000 (99.99% CI, which is a range that is twice as
wide as the original) or through the wording “a lot higher or lower.” Before
reading this text, participants were asked some questions about their beliefs
about the state of the country and economy, and afterward, they were asked
the same exact questions as in study 1 (SI Appendix).
Experiment 3.
Sample and design. In experiment 3, we aimed to test various other numeric
and verbal uncertainty communication formats, still in the context of un-
employment for consistency using a relatively highmagnitude of uncertainty.
This study had eight conditions, and we recruited n = 1,200 participants from
Prolific, based on power calculations that indicated this would give us 90%
power to detect a small (f = 0.125) effect when α was set at 0.05. The sample
consisted of 806 women and 388 men (average age, 36.65; SD, 11.98; range,
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18 to 85). Just as in experiments 1 and 2, the sample was relatively highly
educated compared to the UK population (no educational qualifications,
1.3%; upper secondary, 34.7%; tertiary education, 63.7%) and on average
slightly leaning toward a liberal political orientation (M = 3.40; SD = 1.38).
After answering questions about their beliefs about the state of the country
and economy, people read a version of the following text, which was designed
to read more like a short news article to increase ecological validity:
UK unemployment drops
Official figures from the first quarter of 2018 show that UK unemploy-
ment fell by 116,000 compared with the same period last year.
This puts the total number of people who are unemployed at 1.42
million.
The number of those in work increased and wage growth improved over
the same period. However, weak incomes have been a problem for a
decade. “It will take a long period of wages rising above the rate of
inflation for people to feel significantly better off,” one economics
commentator is quoted as saying.
This version served as the control condition. We tested three numeric
uncertainty communication formats, three verbal formats, and a mixed
numeric/verbal format (Table 1).
Measures. After reading the text, participants were asked the same questions
as in experiments 1 and 2, except now specified for each number (the fall in
unemployment and the total number of unemployed people) for the recall
question, their perception of uncertainty around the numbers (α = 0.80) and
trust in the numbers (α = 0.92). For the analyses, answers were averaged
across both numbers given that there were no meaningful or significant
differences between the two. Trust in the source was assessed with the item
“To what extent do you think the civil servants who are responsible for these
unemployment figures are trustworthy?” on a scale from 1 = not at all to 7 =
very trustworthy. In addition, we asked people to what extent they thought
journalists who write articles such as the one they read were trustworthy,
and to what extent they thought government statistics in general were re-
liable (on scales from 1 = not at all to 7 = very trustworthy [reliable]).
Experiment 4.
Sample and design. Experiment 4 was preregistered at aspredicted.org (https://
aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=d3xu67). We recruited 1,050 adults who lived in
the United Kingdom to participate in this study via Qualtrics Panels, based
on power calculations that indicated we would need 995 participants to
have 90% power to detect a small (f = 0.125) effect when α was set at 0.05.
This sample was nationally representative of the general UK population in
terms of age, gender, and geography quotas (51% female; mean age, 45.34 y;
SD, 16.47; age range, 18 to 86). In this sample, 8.9% of the participants had
no educational qualifications, 44.8% had attained upper secondary educa-
tion, and 46.1% had tertiary education. On average, the sample was again
slightly leaning liberal (M = 3.74; SD = 1.51).
Treatment and procedure. We aimed to test whether we would find the same
results when communicating uncertainty around amore contentious topic, so
we presented people with a text about migration statistics based on a BBC
News article of these Office of National Statistics figures (52):
Migration figures: EU migration still adding to UK population
Official figures from last year show that there were 101,000 more people
coming to the UK from the EU than leaving in 2017. This is the lowest EU
net migration figure since 2013, but it means that EU migrants are still
adding to the UK population.
Net migration is the difference between the number of people coming
to live in the UK for at least 12 months and those emigrating. The 2017
overall net migration figure (both from the EU and non-EU countries) is
also down, from record highs in 2015 and early 2016.
However, “The figures show that the government remains a long way
off from meeting its objective to cut overall net migration, EU and non-
EU, to the tens of thousands,” one Home Affairs correspondent is
quoted as saying.
This experiment had five conditions (Table 1): Besides the control condi-
tion (above, no uncertainty), uncertainty was communicated numerically
with a range after the point estimate, or via “+/− two standard errors”; or
verbally using the word “around” before the estimate of 101,000, or with an
explicit verbal statement.
Measures. Before reading the text, participants answered demographic ques-
tions and questions about their beliefs about the state of society and the
economy and their attitudes toward migration [with three items from the
European Social Survey (53): “Would you say it is generally good for the UK’s
economy that people come to live here from other countries?”: 1 = very bad
for the economy to 7 = very good for the economy; “Would you say that the
UK’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live
here from other countries?”: 1 = cultural life undermined to 7 = cultural life
enriched; “Is the UK made a worse or a better place to live by people coming
to live here from other countries?”: 1 = worse place to live to 7 = better place
to live; α = 0.91]. After reading the text, participants answered the same
questions as in experiments 1 and 2. Perceived trustworthiness of the source
was assessed with the item, “To what extent do you think the civil servants
who are responsible for these migration figures are trustworthy?” on a scale
from 1 = not at all to 7 = very trustworthy. In addition, we asked people to
what extent they thought the conclusions based on the number; the news
article they just read; and journalists who write articles such as the one they
read were trustworthy, and to what extent government statistics in general
were reliable (on scales from 1 = not at all to 7 = very trustworthy [reliable]).
Experiment 5: Field Experiment with BBC News.
Sample and design. For this field experiment, we worked with BBC News and
the BBC’s Head of Statistics. After gaining experience with the process of
running a field experiment in this context during a Pilot Study in September
2019 (SI Appendix), we conducted the experiment on October 15, 2019,
using BBC News Online’s coverage of the October Labor Market Release
from the UK Office for National Statistics. After the labor market figures
were released, we worked with the relevant journalists and the Head of
Statistics to select a target figure to communicate uncertainty before the
news article was published on the website. The journalists were responsible
for the content of the news article. The target figure we selected was the UK
unemployment rate, which was the first figure mentioned in the news story
(Fig. 6). The field experiment had three conditions: visitors of the website
were randomly shown a version of the news article in which the target
figure was presented without any uncertainty (“. . . rose to 3.9%”); with a
verbal uncertainty cue (“. . . rose to an estimated 3.9%”); or with a numeric
range and verbal cue [“. . . rose to an estimated 3.9% (between 3.7 and
4.1%)”]. At the bottom of the first paragraph of the news article, readers
were invited to “Click here to take part in a short study about this article run
by the University of Cambridge.”
BBC News website visitors were able to participate in the study for about
24 h. During that time, 2,462 people clicked on the survey link, which took
people to the starting page of the online survey with information about the
study and informed consent. The survey was completed by 1,700 people (18
of whom completed the dependent variables but not demographics): 549
people in the control condition, 557 in the numeric condition, and 594 in the
verbal condition. A technical issue that was created when the journalistic
team updated the story after its first release resulted in participants in both
experimental conditions also being shown the control condition version of
the story, without any uncertainty mentioned, between 10:00 AM and 10:49
AM UK time. We therefore had to exclude all participants in the experi-
mental conditions who participated between in that time frame, which were
69 participants in the numerical and 94 in the verbal condition. We also
excluded five participants who reported to be below 18 y of age, and one
outlier who reported being 114 y old (which was extremely unlikely). The
final sample consisted of 1,531 people: 520 participants in the control con-
dition, 463 in the numerical condition, and 470 in the verbal condition. We
had no control over the exact number of people that would participate in
this field study, so we conducted a sensitivity analysis to compute the effect
size that we should be able to detect with 1,531 participants in three groups,
α = 0.05 and 90% power: which is a small effect, f = 0.09. There were 1,131
men (73.9%) and 344 women (22.5%) who participated, with an average
age of 44.82 (SD, 15.29; range, 18 to 86). The sample was relatively highly
educated: 30.5% indicated to have obtained a higher degree (MSc, PhD, or
equivalent), 43.6% a bachelor’s degree, 22.5% school (GCSE, A-level, or
equivalent), and 1% indicated to have not completed formal education.
Measures. After reading information about the study and providing informed
consent, participants first answered a question about their current affec-
tive state, “How does the information you just read make you feel?”:
on a feeling thermometer from 0 = negative/unhappy to 10 = positive/
happy, and subsequently a comprehension question (SI Appendix). Next, we
assessed perceived uncertainty (“How certain or uncertain do you think the
unemployment rate figure in the story is?”: on a scale from 1 = very certain
to 7 = very uncertain), trust in the number (“How trustworthy do you think
the unemployment rate figure in the story is?”: 1 = not at all trustworthy to
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7 = very trustworthy), trust in the source (“How trustworthy do you think
the statisticians responsible for producing the figure are?”: 1 = not at all
trustworthy to 7 = very trustworthy), competence of the source (“How
competent do you think the statisticians responsible for producing the fig-
ure are?”: 1 = not at all competent to 7 = very competent), and trust in the
journalistic source (“How trustworthy do you think the journalist responsible
for writing the story is?”: 1 = not at all trustworthy to 7 = very trustworthy).
The questionnaire finished with asking participants for their age, gender,
and the highest level of education they had completed.
Data Availability. The datasets collected and analyzed in the reported studies
are available on the Open Science Framework, https://osf.io/mt6s7/ (DOI:10.17605/
OSF.IO/MT6S7).
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